DIMAP, University of Warwick, UK

Speakers/Presentations:

The workshop had 28 invited presentations on recent research in algorithmic game theory centred around five keynote presentations and panel discussion. Below is the list of speakers, titles of their talks, and links to the abstracts (including most of the slides) of the talks.

PANEL DISCUSSION (Monday, March 26, 6pm):

• »Algorithmic Game Theory - Where Does it Stand and Where Can it Go?« led by Vijay V. Vazirani.

  Panelist: Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Tech), Frank Kelly (Cambridge University), Noam Nisan (Hebrew University), Christos H. Papadimitriou (Berkeley), David M. Pennock (Yahoo! Research), Tim Roughgarden (Stanford), and Éva Tardos (Cornell).

Keynote speakers:

• Noam Nisan (Hebrew University, Israel)
  • Approximation Mechanisms and Characterization of Implementable Social Choice Rules
• Christos H. Papadimitriou (University of California at Berkeley, USA)
  • Equilibria and Complexity: What now?
• Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University, USA)
  • Quantifying Inefficiency in Mechanism and Protocol Design
• Éva Tardos (Cornell University, USA)
  • Pricing Games in Networks
• Vijay V. Vazirani (Georgia Institute of Technology, USA)
  • Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm

Invited speakers:

• Yossi Azar (Tel Aviv University, Israel and Microsoft Research, Redmond, USA)
  • (Almost) Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Unrelated Machine Scheduling
• Richard Cole (New York University, USA)
  • Why Might Markets be Self-converging? A Local, Quickly Convergent Tatonnement Algorithm
• Vincent Conitzer (Duke University, USA)
  • Preprocessing Techniques for Computing Nash Equilibria
• Shahar Dobzinski (Hebrew University, Israel)
  • Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions with Subadditive Bidders
• Kousha Etessami (University of Edinburgh, UK)
  • On the Complexity of Approximating Exact Fixed Points: Nash Equilibria, Stochastic Games, and Recursive Markov Chains
• Uri Feige (Weizmann Institute, Israel and Microsoft Research, Redmond, USA)
  • On Allocations that Maximize Fairness
• Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
  • Efficient Contention Resolution Protocols for Selfish Agents
• Jason D. Hartline (Microsoft Research, Mountain View, USA)
  • The Simple Mathematics of Optimal Auctions
• Kamal Jain (Microsoft Research, Redmond, USA)
  • On Stability of the Core
• Frank Kelly (Cambridge University, UK)
  • Congestion Control Algorithms
• Elias Koutsoupias (University of Athens, Greece)
  • Lower Bounds of Mechanisms for Scheduling Unrelated Machines
• Piotr Krysta (University of Liverpool, UK)
  • Approximability of Pricing Problems
• Stefano Leonardi (Universita' di Roma "La Sapienza", Roma, Italy)
  • Efficient Cost Sharing Mechanisms for Prize-collecting Steiner Forest
• Burkhard Monien (University of Paderborn, Germany)
  • The Power of Two-Prices: Beyond Cross-Monotonicity
• Seffi Naor (Microsoft Research and Technion, Haifa, Israel)
  • Best Response Dynamics in Multicast Cost Sharing
• David M. Pennock (Yahoo! Research, New York, USA)
  • Computational Aspects of Prediction Markets
• Amir Ronen (Technion, Haifa, Israel)
  • The Local and Global Price of Anarchy of Graphical Games
• Amin Saberi (Stanford University, USA)
  • Approximation Algorithms for Max-Min Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods
• Paul Spirakis (University of Patras, Greece, and CTI Patras, Greece)
  • Well-Supported Approximate Nash Equilibria
• Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics, United Kingdom)
  • Finding all Nash Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game
• Adrian Vetta (McGill University, Canada)
  • Finding Nash Equilibria in Certain Classes of 2-Player Game
• Berthold Vöcking (RWTH Aachen, Germany)
  • Inapproximability of Congestion Games
• Uri Zwick (Tel Aviv University, Israel)
  • Simple Stochastic Games, Mean Payoff Games and Parity Games