

An Outlook on the Impact of Trust Models on Routing in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs)¹

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Abstract

In a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET), nodes cannot rely on any fixed infrastructure for routing purposes. Rather, they have to cooperate to achieve this objective. However, the absence of any trusted third party in such networks may result in nodes deviating from the routing protocol for selfish or malicious reasons. The concept of trusted routing has been promoted to handle the problems selfish and malicious nodes cause to the network. Existing work on trusted routing has focused on integrating a trust model into the routing protocol to tolerate various classes of attacks. However, little is known about whether a trust model is effective against all the attack classes. In this paper, we show that, in general, trust models help in achieving better efficiency in MANETs in the presence of rational and malicious behavior. We also show that the trust model used achieves varied efficiency against different attack classes, showing that a single trust model may not be sufficient to handle all the attack classes.

Keywords: Trust, routing, ad-hoc networks, MANETs, AODV, ns-2.

1 Introduction

A mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) is a wireless network with no fixed infrastructure and no central administration. Nodes in the network usually have limited resources for computation, bandwidth, memory, and energy. Because nodes are mobile, the topology of the network varies. Because MANETs are invariably multihop networks, message routing is important. However, message routing in MANETs is a significant problem. The lack of central administration means nodes cannot be forced to cooperate for message routing. Nodes may deviate from the protocol for selfish or malicious reasons. For example a selfish user may wish to preserve energy resources, while a malicious user might attempt a denial of service attack. Routing protocols must cope with such selfish and malicious behaviours.

Secure routing protocols such as [3] have been proposed as potential solutions to the problem. However, most of these protocols assume the existence of a central authority or trusted third party, which conflict with the very notion

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of MANETs. Recently, a new class of routing protocols has been proposed, namely trusted routing. Trusted routing protocols consist of two parts: a routing protocol, and a trust model. Routing decisions are made according to the trust model. Trust and reputation have been used in many settings to cope with uncertainty in interactions. Trust is used to assess the risk associated with cooperating with others; it is an estimate of how likely another user is to fulfil its commitments [2, 6]. Trust can be derived from direct interactions and from reputation.

One of the first work on trusted routing was proposed by Marti *et.al* [?]. Their routing protocol consisted of 3 parts, namely the routing protocol, a watchdog component and a pathrater component. The watchdog component was responsible for determining if a neighbour node was deviating from the protocol (e.g., not forwarding packets, tampering with packets etc). The pathrater component uses information from the watchdog components to rate the quality of the paths for routing. Subsequently, several other works on trusted routing have appeared. Our work is inspired by Pirzada and McDonald's (hereafter referred to as P&M) trusted routing model [8, 9]. Based on Marsh's [6] work on computational trust, P&M use trust for routing in ad-hoc networks and obtain promising simulation results. Their approach (described below) is sophisticated and combines a range of situational trust assessments into an overall trust assessment for making decisions. Our view is that although such sophistication offers rich information on which to base decisions, similar levels of resistance to malicious behaviour can be achieved with a simpler approach.

One of the main limitations of current approaches is that the results do not discern the effect of trust against specific types of behavior. Specifically, in current approaches for trusted routing, a single trust model is used to tolerate both malicious and selfish behavior. However, little is known about the suitability of a single trust model to handle these different kinds of behaviors. In this paper, we investigate the impact of a trust model on routing in MANETs subject to malicious and selfish behavior. Our main finding is that a given trust model has different impact on the routing performance, depending on the behaviors that occur. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses this problem.

Roadmap: In Section 2, we discuss some related work. In Section 3, we discuss the network model, the attacker model and the trust models that we use to handle the attackers. In Section 4, we present the simulation results obtained from simulating the trusted AODV protocol. Finally, we conclude the paper with a summary and pointers for future work in Section 5.

2 Background

In this section, we briefly introduce key work that relates to our approach. We begin by introducing the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol, and then discuss selected trust models and how trust relates to routing.

2.1 Routing protocols

There are two major classes of routing protocols for MANETs: proactive and reactive protocols. In proactive protocols, nodes use resources to keep track of routes in a routing table, whereas in reactive protocols, routes are discovered when needed to preserve nodes' resources. In this paper, we focus on the AODV reactive protocol as it is an efficient low-overhead approach. There also exist hybrid protocols, that combine features of proactive and reactive protocols, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.

In AODV [7], when a source node wants to communicate with a destination node, but does not have a route to the destination, it initiates a route discovery. The source node broadcasts a **RREQ** (route request message) to all of its neighbours. Each neighbour that receives the **RREQ** will check in its own routing table to see if it has a route to the specified destination. If not, it will set up a reverse path towards the sender of the **RREQ**, and then re-broadcast the **RREQ**. Any node receiving the **RREQ** will generate a **RREP** (route reply message) if it either has a fresh enough route to the destination, or is itself the destination. This **RREP** is then unicast to the next hop towards the originator of the **RREQ**. When a node receives a **RREP**, it updates the appropriate fields in its routing table and in the **RREP**, and then forwards the **RREP** to the next hop until it reaches the original sender. A sender node can have multiple routes to the destination. However, the chosen route is the shortest one between the sender and destination. This relies on the underlying assumption that all nodes are trustworthy and will never deviate from the protocol. In this paper we do not make this assumption, and use trust to mitigate against malicious or faulty behaviour.

2.2 Dependable routing

The majority of routing mechanisms for MANETs rely on the assumption that nodes will never deviate, but in a real-world MANET this assumption is unrealistic. Because resources in a MANET are scarce, nodes may act selfishly such as not forwarding a message. In the worst case, nodes may act in an arbitrary fashion, i.e., display Byzantine behaviour [1]. Hence, to handle these problems, techniques such as secure routing [12] and trusted routing [8] have been proposed. In secure routing, cryptographic primitives are used to ensure properties such as confidentiality, integrity etc. However, secure routing requires a centralised trusted third party, making it impractical for MANETs. Trusted routing, on the other hand, can be used to handle both selfish and Byzantine nodes. In trusted routing, a trust model is embedded within the routing algorithm, and routing decisions are taken based, not on shortest path, but on trust values. Thus, in trusted routing, the path with the highest trust is chosen.

2.3 Trust models

Numerous models of trust and reputation exist to support cooperation in computational environments [5, 10]. One of the earliest approaches is Marsh's for-

malism [6]. Marsh uses the outcomes of direct interactions among entities to calculate situational and general trust. Situational trust is the level of trust in another for a specific type of situation, while general trust refers to overall trustworthiness irrespective of the situation. After each interaction an entity considers whether the other entity fulfilled its obligations. If so, then trust increases, but trust decreases if commitments are broken. To minimise the risk of failure entities will interact with the most trusted of the potential interaction partners.

Marsh's formalism is the base of many subsequent models, which supplement trust based on direct interactions with other information sources to inform decision making. For example, sophisticated approaches such as ReGreT [11] and FIRE [4] add reputation information provided by third parties and knowledge of social structures to arrive at overall trust assessments. However, whilst powerful, such sophisticated models are not appropriate for routing in MANETs where resources are scarce and knowledge of social relationships between nodes is unlikely to be available.

Several trust models have been developed for peer-to-peer systems [13, 14, 15], based on sharing recommendation information to establish reputation. Although in principle these could be applied to routing in MANETs, there are two important problems. First, there is significant network overhead due to the additional information exchanged. Second, addressing the potential for malicious recommendations requires a trusted third party (or a computationally expensive public-key infrastructure), which goes against the nature of MANETs.

There are few trust mechanisms designed for ad-hoc networks. Zhou and Haas [16] describe a cryptographic scheme to ensure node integrity. However, their approach requires complex pre-configuration of servers to provide a distributed certification authority and relies on cryptographic operations which are costly in computation and power. P&M propose arguably the most appropriate mechanism, where nodes calculate situational trust according to observed events and then use an aggregated general trust for routing decisions. Nodes record information about others for various event types: acknowledgements, packet precision, gratuitous route replies, blacklists, HELLO packets, destination unreachable messages and authentication objects. For each type, the proportion of positive events is taken to correspond to the situational trust. Situational trust values are then aggregated using a weighted product to give overall trust. When routing, nodes will forward packets to maximise trust (rather than minimising cost in standard AODV). P&M have obtained promising simulation results, but we argue that similar positive effects can be obtained with a greatly simplified trust model.

3 The Proposed Model: Simple Trusted AODV

3.1 Network model

The setting for our approach is a simple MANET in which we assume that nodes are situated in a bounded 2-dimensional space, within which they are free to move. For simplicity we assume they move randomly around the space. Each node has individual characteristics that define its speed of movement and the range over which it can transmit messages. The positions and transmission ranges define the network neighbourhood, since nodes can only transmit to others within their transmission range, and can only receive messages from others when they are within their range. Thus, if two nodes are within each others' transmission range they are free to communicate, but otherwise intermediate nodes are needed to forward packets. We assume that nodes use AODV as described above, and we describe below our approach for incorporating trust into AODV.

3.2 Attack model

The standard AODV protocol assumes that nodes are fully functional and benevolent, and does not cope well if this is not the case. This has led to the development of trusted routing protocols such as that proposed by P&M. In developing their protocol, P&M describe several possible attacks, and their simulations allow malicious nodes to use any of these. Consequently, it is impossible to evaluate their trust model against *specific* attack types. In this paper, therefore, we concentrate on a small number of specific attacks and test our model against each type individually.

We consider two varieties of blackhole and a greyhole attack. A blackhole is a malicious node that attempts to drop all packets, typically by forging route replies to create fake routes with it as an intermediate node. This allows the blackhole to divert and intercept traffic from across the network, and subsequently drop all packets that it receives. A greyhole can be viewed as a faulty node, rather than explicitly malicious. Greyholes do not falsify route replies, but instead will periodically drop packets. This might be due to a fault or due to malicious intentions. Regardless of the reason, greyholes appear as intermittently faulty nodes to the rest of the network. There are several possible mechanisms to implement these attacks within AODV, and we use the following definitions.

3.2.1 Blackhole on route (Blackhole-OnRoute)

This is our simplest blackhole definition, and operates by replying that it has a fresh enough route to the destination whenever it receives a **RREQ**, regardless of whether it actually knows a route. The generated **RREP** has the same sequence number as the **RREQ**, causing it to be accepted by the original sender, which subsequently creates a route with the **Blackhole-OnRoute** node as an intermediate node. This kind of a blackhole is partially guarded against within AODV,

since if the original RREQ eventually reaches the intended destination a RREP will be generated. The reply from the destination itself has an increased sequence number over the RREQ. Thus, the reply from the actual destination overwrites the malicious route setup by the `Blackhole-OnRoute` node. Despite this, in our simulations `Blackhole-OnRoute` was able to cause significant packet loss, as the routes it created intercept the first packets sent across any new route until the destination's RREP was received.

3.2.2 Blackhole fake destination reply (`Blackhole-FakeDestReply`)

This blackhole is more malicious than `Blackhole-OnRoute`, since in addition to claiming to have a recent enough route to the destination it also increases the sequence number in the RREP. The effect is that `Blackhole-FakeDestReply`'s route is not overwritten by any reply subsequently returning from the destination itself. Thus, a route to the actual destination will only be established when the destination's RREP is received before that generated by the `Blackhole-FakeDestReply` node.

3.2.3 Greyhole (`Greyhole`)

The `Greyhole` does not falsify route replies in order to intercept packets, but instead simulates a node having intermittent faults. We characterise a `Greyhole` using two time periods:

- `MAX_TIME_TO_BURST_FAULT`: maximum time to the next burst fault (seconds)
- `MAX_TIME_BURST_FAULT_LASTS`: maximum burst fault duration (seconds)

Using these time periods a node will start a burst fault at a random time between 0 and `MAX_TIME_TO_BURST_FAULT`. The burst fault lasts for a random period between 0 and `MAX_TIME_BURST_FAULT_LASTS`. These parameters can be modified to alter the nature of the faults.

3.3 Trust model — Simple Trusted AODV (`ST-AODV`)

There are many potential mechanisms for determining whether a node can be trusted, based on observing the nodes' activities and behaviours. The influence of these observations can be combined to determine a trust level. P&M use several aspects of node behaviour including acknowledgements, packet precision, gratuitous route replies etc., as described in Section 2. Our view is that the effect of malicious nodes can be significantly reduced using a much simpler scheme. We build our trust models using acknowledgements as the single observable factor on which to assess trust. We believe that acknowledgements offer an effective indication of a node's trustworthiness.

An acknowledgement is a means of ensuring that packets which have been sent for forwarding have actually been forwarded. There are a number of ways

that this is possible, but *passive acknowledgement* is the simplest. Passive acknowledgement uses promiscuous mode to monitor the channel, which allows a node to detect any transmitted packets, irrelevant of the actual destination that they are intended for. Using this method a node can ensure that packets it has sent to a neighbouring node for forwarding are indeed forwarded.

To record trust information about a node, we introduce a `TrustNode` data store, which comprises a `nodeID`, a `packetBuffer`, and an integer `trustValue` for the node. Each node maintains a `TrustNode` for each of the nodes that it has sent packets to for forwarding. To detect whether a packet is successfully forwarded, the packets that have been recently sent for forwarding are stored in the `packetBuffer`. This is a circular buffer, meaning that if packets are not removed frequently enough the buffer will cycle, erasing the oldest elements. Thus, if a node is dropping packets or is being unacceptably slow at forwarding packets then the buffer will cycle. Otherwise, if the node is performing acceptably then when the promiscuous mode detects a forwarded packet, it can be found and removed from the buffer.

In ST-AODV we use a simple trust model, where the `trustValue` for each node is initialised to 0. With each observation, the value is incremented for nodes that are detected to forward packets and decremented for nodes that do not appear to forward packets. To check whether a node is sufficiently trusted we introduce a `minTrust` threshold such that nodes with `trustValue <= minTrust` are considered untrusted. If a node is untrusted then it is not sent packets for forwarding, and any replies it gives to route requests are ignored. Once a node becomes untrusted it is barred from consideration for packet forwarding by dropping it from the set of neighbours, removing all routes that use it, and sending out a new `RREQ` to re-establish the removed routes. Similarly, when receiving a `RREP` the first hop node is checked and if it is untrusted then the reply is disregarded. Thus, only routes where the first hop is trusted are established. Nodes make routing choices based on trust as well as the number of hops, such that the selected next hop gives the shortest trusted path.

4 Simulation and Results

In this section, we perform simulation experiments of ST-AODV in presence of malicious and faulty (grey) nodes using the ns-2 network simulator³. Nodes are situated in a bounded 2-dimensional world about which they wander randomly. We use a network of 50 nodes in the simulations discussed below. The network contains benevolent nodes that use ST-AODV to make routing decisions, and malicious nodes that use one of the attacks defined in Section 3. The `minTrust` threshold used for barring nodes is set at -10. We obtain the following metrics from our results (which are averaged over a number of runs):

- **Packet throughput:** ratio of packets received by the destination to the number of packets sent (%)

³<http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/>

- **Average latency:** average time for packets to reach their destination (seconds)
- **Packet overhead:** ratio of control packets generated to the total number of data packets sent (%)
- **Byte overhead:** ratio of control bytes generated to the total number of data bytes sent (%)

Once these metrics are evaluated, we compare the metrics across attack classes. For example, we compare average latency of ST-AODV in presence of **Blackhole-FakeDestReply** attacks and **Greyhole** attacks. The main aim is to show that the trust model has different impact on the performance of ST-AODV in presence of different attacks. In some cases, results show that the difference can be upto 300% in the case of having different malicious attacks (but of different severity) (see Fig. 1 (packet overhead)). The differences are still more prominent when comparing a malicious attack with a benign attack (greyhole) (see Fig. 2 (packet overhead)), where the difference can be upto 1000%.

In Fig. 1, ST-AODV is shown to outperform standard AODV in presence of malicious nodes (i.e., **Blackhole-FakeDestReply** and **Blackhole-OnRoute** nodes). From the figures, we can deduce the trust model used in this paper is better suited for the **Blackhole-OnRoute** attack rather than the **Blackhole-FakeDestReply** attack, since ST-AODV performs better in presence of **Blackhole-OnRoute** nodes. For example, in the case of packet overhead, ST-AODV induces a threefold increase, in the worst case, in overhead in presence of **Blackhole-FakeDestReply** nodes than in presence of **Blackhole-OnRoute** nodes.

A similar pattern can be observed in figures 2 and 3. In Fig. 2, the packet overhead induced by ST-AODV in presence of **Blackhole-FakeDestReply** nodes is 10-times more than in the presence of **Greyhole** nodes. In Fig. 3 (for the case of **Blackhole-OnRoute** nodes vs **Greyhole** nodes), the difference is 5-fold.

In general, we observe that the trust model used in the paper is more suited to more benign attack classes, e.g., **Greyhole** nodes. The more malicious the nodes are, the worse is the impact on the performance of ST-AODV. Though it is intuitive that more resources need to be spent to handle more severe attacks, the differences can be quite high. Also, this also shows that, to tolerate malicious attacks, trust information may need to be gathered from more than just using passive acknowledgement. Because greyhole attacks drop packets at random, passive acknowledgement seems well-suited to detect whether a node is forwarding a packet or not, i.e., whether the node is behaving properly or is performing a greyhole attack. On the other hand, for malicious nodes, passive acknowledgement is not sufficient. This shows that the choice and impact of trust models (and their implementation) on the performance of trusted routing protocols is important if their performances are to be high as possible.




Figure 1: Comparing the impact of trust on network performance in presence of the Blackhole-FakeDestReply and the Blackhole-OnRoute attacks.




Figure 2: Comparing the impact of trust on network performance in presence of the Blackhole-FakeDestReply and the Greyhole attacks.




Figure 3: Comparing the impact of trust on network performance in presence of the Blackhole-OnRoute and the Greyhole attacks.

5 Conclusions and Summary

We have described a simple trust model that extends AODV to cope with malicious and selfish nodes. Our simulations show significant improvements in throughput, at the expense of packet and byte overhead. For low proportions of malicious nodes in the population the increase in overhead is relatively small given the improvement in throughput. Our results also show how different attacks affect a network. In particular, using standard AODV a **Blackhole-Fake-DestReply** attack significantly reduces throughput compared to **Blackhole-OnRoute** and **Greyhole** attacks. Using ST-AODV we are able to minimise this difference and to protect the network effectively against all three attacks. We also show that a single trust model has different performance impact on the routing model, depending on the attacks.

Specifically, we have shown that a simple trust model, implemented on top of passive acknowledgement, is not very efficient when handling malicious attacks, such as **Blackhole-FakeDestReply** and **Blackhole-OnRoute**. However, its performance in presence of greyhole attacks is better. We conclude then that such a simple trust model can be used in presence of a benign attacks, but more sophisticated models need to be used to handle the more malicious attacks.

We are considering several extensions to ST-AODV, including a more flexible (non-linear) trust update function and improved monitoring using promiscuous mode to monitor all traffic, rather than only a node's own packet forwarding requests. We are also investigating more flexible sanctions against untrusted nodes, such as temporary blacklisting. Finally we aim to explore how different trust models perform against different attacks and combinations of attack.

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Biographical Sketch

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