

# Dealing with Uncertainty

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Introduction to Artificial Intelligence  
2nd Part

# Uncertainty and Probabilities

# The main reference



Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig

Artificial Intelligence: a modern approach

Chapter 13

# Outline

- Uncertainty
- Probability
- Probability and logic
- Inference

# Uncertain outcomes

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- ④ immense complexity of modelling and predicting traffic

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“ $S_{25}$  will not get me there on time”
- ② or too weak:
  - “ $S_{25}$  will not get me there on time unless there's no delay on the District Line and it doesn't rain and I haven't forgotten the keys at home etc.”

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Also, fuzzy logic handles **degrees of truth**. It doesn't arguably handle uncertainty e.g., *Asleep* is true to degree 0.2

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Causal connections?

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- laziness: failure to enumerate exceptions, qualifications, etc.
- ignorance: lack of relevant facts, initial conditions, etc.
- Subjective/Bayesian view: Probabilities relate propositions to one's own state of knowledge e.g.,

$$P(S_{25} \text{ gets me there on time} | \text{no reported accidents}) = 0.3$$

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- Analogous to logical entailment status  $KB \models \alpha$ , not truth.

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$S_0$ : ages in the Huxley building, therefore feeling miserable.

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Decision theory = utility theory + probability theory

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$w \in \Omega$  is a **sample point/possible world/atomic event**

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e.g.,  $P(1) = P(2) = P(3) = P(4) = P(5) = P(6) = 1/6$ .

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E.g.,

$$P(\text{dice roll} < 4) = P(1) + P(2) + P(3) = 1/6 + 1/6 + 1/6 = 1/2$$

# Random variables

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event  $a \wedge b$  = points where  $A(w) = \text{true}$  and  $B(w) = \text{true}$

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$$= P(a) + P(b) - P(a \wedge b)$$

# Probabilities are logical

Theorem (De Finetti 1931)

*An agent who bets according to "illogical" probabilities can be tricked into a bet that loses money regardless of outcome.*

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Continuous e.g., *Temp = 21.6*; *Temp < 22.0*.

# Probabilities

- Unconditional probabilities
- Conditional probabilities

# Prior probability

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Probability distribution gives values for all possible assignments:

$\mathbf{P}(\text{Weather}) = \langle 0.72, 0.1, 0.08, 0.1 \rangle$  (normalized, i.e., sums to 1)

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<i>Weather</i> =	<i>sunny</i>	<i>rain</i>	<i>cloudy</i>	<i>snow</i>
<i>Cavity = true</i>	0.144	0.02	0.016	0.02
<i>Cavity = false</i>	0.576	0.08	0.064	0.08

## Prior probability cont.

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$P(Weather, Cavity)$  = a  $4 \times 2$  matrix of values:

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**Every question about a domain can be answered by the joint distribution because every event is a sum of sample points**

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(Notation for conditional distributions:  $\mathbf{P}(\text{Cavity}|\text{Toothache}) =$   
2-element vector of 2-element vectors)

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This kind of inference is crucial!

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Product rule gives an alternative formulation:

$$P(a \wedge b) = P(a|b)P(b) = P(b|a)P(a)$$

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A general version holds for whole distributions, e.g.,

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# Inference by enumeration

Start with the joint distribution:

	toothache		$\neg$ toothache	
	catch	$\neg$ catch	catch	$\neg$ catch
cavity	.108	.012	.072	.008
$\neg$ cavity	.016	.064	.144	.576

For any proposition  $\varphi$ , sum the atomic events where it is true:

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Can also compute conditional probabilities:

$$\begin{aligned}
 P(\neg \text{cavity} | \text{toothache}) &= \frac{P(\neg \text{cavity} \wedge \text{toothache})}{P(\text{toothache})} \\
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 P(\text{cavity}|\text{toothache}) &= \frac{P(\text{cavity} \wedge \text{toothache})}{P(\text{toothache})} \\
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 \end{aligned}$$

# Normalization

Start with the joint distribution:

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cavity	toothache	.108	.012	.072	.008
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-

Denominator can be viewed as a normalization constant  $\alpha$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{P}(\text{Cavity}|\text{toothache}) &= \alpha \mathbf{P}(\text{Cavity}, \text{toothache}) \\
 &= \alpha [\mathbf{P}(\text{Cavity}, \text{toothache}, \text{catch}) + \mathbf{P}(\text{Cavity}, \text{toothache}, \neg \text{catch})] \\
 &= \alpha [(0.108, 0.016) + (0.012, 0.064)] \\
 &= \alpha \langle 0.12, 0.08 \rangle = \langle 0.6, 0.4 \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

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The terms in the summation are joint entries because  $\mathbf{Y}$ ,  $\mathbf{E}$ , and  $\mathbf{H}$  together exhaust the set of random variables.

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- For nontrivial domains, we must find a way to reduce the size
- Independence and conditional independence provide the tools.

# What's next?

- Bayes' rule
- Conditional and unconditional independence
- (hopefully) Bayesian Networks

# Appendix: Independence

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
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
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


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
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Absolute independence powerful but rare